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VI.-SYMBOLIC REASONING (IIL).1
B T HUGH MACCOLL.
FBOM some helpfol criticisms which I owe to different
logicians I gather that my recent contributions to this
magazine contain certain obscurities; and the editor has
kindly placed a few of its pages at my disposal in order to
l
First comes my assertion (MIND, January, 1899) that a
statement, no matter how high its degree, can be spoken of, not
only as true or false, certain or uncertain, but also as probable
or improbable within more or less exact limiti according to our data.
A difficulty appears to be felt as to the exact meaning I should
attach to such a statement as, for example, A*1**, and espe-
cially as to how I could, under any conceivable circumstances,
express the exact chance of its truth or falsehood. Before
giving any concrete examples by way of illustration, it will
be as well, and perhaps not liTnnnTiiriTig, to translate the
above symbolic statement into ordinary language. The
symbol A is short for AT, and may be read " A is true "; the
exponent r being often left understood, like the sign + in
common algebra. The symbol A* may be read " It is im-
possible that A is true ". The symbol Ar may be read " It
is false that it IB impossible that A is true "; which may be
abbreviated into " It is possible that A is true," or, more
conveniently still, into "A is possible". The symbol A**
may be read " It is certain that it is false that it is impossible
that A is true"; which may be abbreviated into "A is
certainly possible". The symbol A'1" may be read "It ia
certain that it is certain that it is false that it is impossible
that A is true"; which may be abbreviated into " It is
certain that A is certainly possible ".
Probably no reader—at least no English reader, born and
brought up in England—«an go through the full unabbre-
viated translation of this symbolic statement A*1** into ordi-
1
 (For n. see Mnro, October, 1897.)
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7 6 ' HUGH MACCOLL :
nary speech without being forcibly reminded of a certain
nursery composition, whose ever-increasing accumulation of
thats affords such pleasure to the infantine mind; I allude,
of course, to "The House that Jack Built". But trivial
matters in appearance often supply excellent illustrations of
important general principles. There is a story that Sir
Isaac Newton was once thought to be in his second child-
hood because he was seen one summer day at his open
window gravely engaged in blowing soap-bubbles, which he
appeared to regard with intense interest, as, one after
another, they slowly floated away in the sunlight. It was
however no case of second childhood : the great philosopher
was really engaged in studying the laws of reflexion, re-
fraction and colour; and soap-bubbles happened to afford
the most suitable data for a particularly promising line of
investigation.
Prof, de Morgan's remark1 that Probability was " the .
unknown God whom the schoolmen ignorantly worshipped "
when, in their logical dissertations, they discussed the subject
of modality, was as true as it was witty; and the remark might
beextended to their treatment of other logical questions besides
those of modality. Undoubtedly there is an intimate con-
nexion which Boole was, I bekeve, the firsu to point out,
between the mathematical theory of chances and all problems
of formal logic. Boole did not succeed in clearly explaining
this connexion, mainly because of his erroneous conception
as to the real meaning (in dealing with such problems) of the
word independent. This meaning I will define presently; I
now proceed to give a concrete illustration of the preceding
symbolic statement A1""', and of the exact value (in certain
circumstances) of the chance of its being true.
As in my sixth and seventh papers in the Proceedings of the
Mathematical Society, I use the fractional symbol 5 to denote
the chance that A is true on the assumption that B is true; B
being some hypothesis consistent with, but not necessarily
implied in, the data of the problem. Hence — must denote
the chance that A is true on the assumption that e is true;
that is to say, — denotes the chance that A is true on no
assumption beyond tlie data of the problem. Thus, when we
simply speak of the chance that A is true, we must be under-
1
 See Dr. Venn's Logic of Chance, p. 299.
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SYMBOLIC SEASONING. 77
stood to mean — This notation leads necessarily to the
formula (we will call it f) :
AB A B B A
€ " € ' A " « " B '
which symbolically expresses a well-known and easily proved
theorem in probability. This formula will be assumed in
what follows.
Fic.l. F.o.3.
Let any one of these three figures be assumed, and out of
the ten points in the circle E belonging to it let a point P be
taken at random. Let A, as a statement, assert that P
will turn out to be one of the points in the circle A; and let
E assert that it will be one of the points in the circle E.
Now, whatever figure we assume, the point P being, by
hypothesis, taken in and restricted throughout to the circle
E, the statement E must always be a certainty; whereas the
statement A will be a certainty, impossibility, or a variable
according to the figure we assume. In Fig. 1 we have A a
certainty (A'); in Fig. 2 we have A an impossibility (A*); and
in Fig. 3 we have A a variable (A*) ; the exact chance of the
truth of A in the last case being
 TV
But suppose we neither assume Fig. 1, nor Fig. 2 nor
Fig. 3, but take one of the three figures at random; and then,
in whatever figure happens to turn up, take (as before) a
point P at random out of. the ten points in the circle E. In
these circumstances what are the respective chances of A,
A', A", A* being true ?
Let F], as a symbolic statement, assert that Fig. 1 will
turn up; F , that Fig. 2 will turn up; and F , that Fig. 3
will turn up. There being no other figures in our hypo-
thetical universe, the disjunctive statement Fj + F , + F , is
a certainty; so that we have
A - A (F! + Fs + F,) = AFt + AF, + APr
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78 HUGH MACCOLL:
Hence, in the notation of chances,
A _ AF,
 + AF, • AF,
f C < C
+ - ' • t + 3» • 4 , by Formula f
€ if, « if,
f <
A I / A
V~3
A . £
\
- i a + o + A) - W.
- ohance that A is tru«.
A- 1/A« . A« . A«
A*
r \ (1 + 0 + 0) - I
- chance that A is certain ;
* , Ai ^ A
+ S
But
Therefore,
Similarly,
And
Also A * - i _ A * - i _ i _ ;
• chance that A is possible.
Thus, from the .data of the three preceding random figures,
we have found — - -5, an equational statement which
implies A**. But it is clear that from different data we might
have arrived at a different result. Let us, for example^
• suppose Fig. 2 to be similar to either Fig. 1 or to Fig, 8.
Then, instead of our former result, we shall have
- J (0 + 1 + 0) - i
that A is impossible.
and, therefore, 4^
 m 1.
€
That is, instead of AT*, we shall have A*".
Let us now suppose that we have three collection! of figures
with corresponding data, namely,1 Klt K,, K,; of which Kx
and K, lead each to this last conclusion A**, while K, leads
to the conclusion A*"*, the denial of AT". Out of the three1
collections K1( K,, K, (which we assume to be the only
of the tluM ooUdctionfl, K|, 1^, E« IB unctorotood
two, thro*, four or any nmnber of figures.
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SYMBOLIC SEASONING. 79
possible ones) let a collection K be taken at random; and let
Kv Kj, K, respectively assert that K will be Kv that K will
be Kj, that K will be K,. We shall then have
A^ K . . K , 1 . 1 2 .
T— l + ^ ^ ° " Q + ~q ~TT»
f « € O O 3
which implies A***. But if, on the other hand, ve suppose
the collection K, (as well as E t and K,) to lead to the con-
clusion A***, and we take one of the three collections at
random, we shall have (since the disjunctive statement
Kj + K, + K, is a certainty)
A*< A*" (K, + K- + K,) K, A ' - ^ K , A ^ ^ K ,
— — -—• --
1 K
 ~ —* • - p — H * • -rr~ + •
a conclusion which iB synonymous with AT".
Finally, suppose that out of m collections of data, ma collec-
tions lead to the conclusion A*"', while the remaining m (1 - a)
collections lead to the denial of this conclusion ; and that out
of the total m collections (all equally probable) we take a
collection at random. In this case the chance that Ar~ is true
will be a, a result which we express symbolically by A*1"*;
that is to say, we conclude that AT- belongs to the class of
statements whose chance of being true is a.
We have thus a concrete illustration of A*** and of the
chance of its being true.
The general principle may be stated thus:—
Let A be a statement of any degree as regards exponents,
and of any complexity as regards the number of its consti-
tuents and the intricacy of their relations; and let Oj, a,,
Oy . . ., a. respectively be the chances of A being true on n-
different hypotheses, all equally probable, and of which one
and one only can be true. If we take one of these n hypo-
theses at random the chance (i.e., the average chance) of A
being true will be— (Oj + a, + at+. . . + a,). If this average
chance is unity, then A is a certainty; if it is tero, A is an
impossibility; if it is a fraction between unity and zero, A is
a variable. These three conclusions are respectively asserted
by the symbols A*, A*, A*. Observe that whatever be the
degree of A, and however complex the relations of its con-
stituents, the conclusion A' (that A is a variable) is perfectly
consistent with the statement A (that A iB true), and also
perfectly consistent with the statement A' (that A is false);
but it is not consistent with A* (that A is certain), nor yet
with A' (that A is impossible).
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8 0 HUGH MACCOLL:
The product of the two certainties A" + A» + A* and A +
A'is
A* + AA« + A'A' + A\
which is synonymous with
A* + AA« + A'Ai' + Ai;
for
AA» - A (A* + A*) •= AA», and A'A* - A' (A« + A*) - A'A#.
Thus we get the four modals of the traditional logic For
A' asserts that A is necessarily true; i.e., the supposition of
its falsehood is inconsistent with our data.
AA" asserts that A is true in a particular case, but uncertain
as a general law. That is, it might, without contradicting our
data, turn out false.
A'A*' asserts that A is false in a particular case, but possible
as a general law. That is, it might, without contradicting our
data turn out true.
A^  asserts that A is necessarily false; i.e., the supposition
of its truth is inconsistent with our data.
Another obscurity that appears to require elucidation is
the distinction which I drew in MIND (October, 1897)
between C : (AB)i and C : (AB)' in dealing with the problem
proposed by the late Lewis Carroll. Some logicians would
consider these two statements equivalent, each implying the
other. As I define my symbols, however, the first is formally
stronger than the second. That is to say, the first, whatever
our data, implies the second ; but the second does, not under
all circumstances, and whatever our data, imply the first.
To prove the non-equivalence of the two statements it will
suffice to give one instance in which, within the limits of the
same data, the first is false and the second true.
F.o.4.
Out of the 25 points in the circle E (Fig. 4) let a point P
be taken at random. Let E, A, B, C respectively assert
 at U
niversity of M
ichigan on A
pril 18, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
SYMBOLIC SEASONING. 81
that P will be in the circle E, that it will be in the circle A,
that it will be in the circle B, that it will be in the circle C.
The statement E is a certainty; the statements A, B, C are
all three variables, whose respective chances of being true are
A. 7T. A ; and the statement AB is also a variable whose
chance of being true is
 T*r. These four conclusions following
necessarily from our data, any statement that contradicts
any one of the four must be an impossibility. Now (AB)%
which asserts that the chance of AB being true is zero, con-
tradicts the fourth conclusion that the chance of AB being
true is ^ j . Hence (AB)1" is not only a statement which
happens to turn out false in a particular case and with re-
gard to a particular random point, but it is inconsistent with
our data, and therefore (within the limits of our data) an
impossibility. Let r)x denote this impossibility (AB)"1, and let 8X
denote the variable statement C. Then we get
C : (AB)' = ex : Vl - %;
for the implication 0l: TJV which asserts that an impossibility
TJV is a factor of a variable 6V is a second impossibility 17,.
Thus, in the given conditions and with the given data,
C : (AB)' is an impossibility.
Next take C : (AB)'. This, by definition of an implication,
is synonymous with (CAB)11, and only asserts that CAB is
an impossibility. Now, in the given conditions of Fig. 4 and
within the limits of our data, this assertion, that CAB is an
impossibilty, is evidently a certainty. Call it e1# We have
therefore in this case, xvithin the limits of the same data,
C : (AByt =
 Vi
C : (AB)' - <,;
which shows that the two statements C : (AB)i and C :
(AB)' are not synonymous. Cases may be given in which
(as here) the first is fake and the second true; others in
which both are true; and others in which both are false;
but no case can be adduced in which the first is true and the
second false. Instances may also be given in which both
are variables; but in none of these instances will the chance
that the first is true exceed the chance that the second is
true ; it will be either less or equal.
We will now examine the question of the mutual de-
pendence or independence of statements.
The symbol 8 ^ expresses the dependence of A upon B. It
A Ais short for = and denotes the increase or diminution inJtJ e
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82 HUGH MACOOLL:
the chance of A being true caused by the addition of the
hypothesis B to our data e. Take Figs. 5, 6, 7 as illus-
E E E
Fio.5 Fto.6.
tratdons. In each of these figures a point P is taken at
random in the circle E, and the statements A and B respec-
tively assert that P will be one of the points in the circle A,
that it will be one of the points in the circle B.
First take Fig. 5. Here we have
SA = A - A . . A B - A - A - J L - + 1
B "* B t ~ ~ B ~ € ~ 4 1 3 ™ 6 2 '
In Fig. 6
In Fig. 7
Similarly
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in Fig. 6, « j - 0 ;
in Fig. 7, 8- .^ - - gg.
Thus we see that in the conditions of Fig. 5 the dependence
is positive ; in Fig. 7 negative; and in Fig. 6 zero. In the
technical language of chances the statements A and B are
said to be independent in the conditions of Fig. 6. This
signification of the word independent does not quite coincide
with its ordinary meaning. When in probability we speak
of two statements A and B as independent, we do not
necessarily assert that there is no connexion (causal or
other) between the events or circumstances to which they
refer, but only that the addition of either statement to our
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SYMBOLIC REASONING. 83
data will neither increase nor diminish the chance of the
other being true.
Putting a for — (the chance that A is true) and b for —
(the chance that B is true), we have the formula
A a B
 J S A o s B
a n d 8 8
The second of these shows that (since a and b are necessarily
positive) 8 ^ and 8 -j- have always the same sign ; that is,
they are either both positive, or both negative, or both zero.
Whether A and B be independent or not, we have the
formula which we have called f, namely,
A B A B B A B , A
— ~7 A - " 7 B - = ftA = 6 B-
Hence, when A and B are independent, we get
AB A B ,
" — . — — ao ;
€ ( f
which expresses another well-known truth in probability.
For the supposition of independence implies that -. - —.
To take a more serious subject of illustration. Let S
assert that a person now forty, and taken at random out of
all the persons of that age now in England, will reach the
age of seventy; and let A assert that his occupation is A.
o
The chance — may be found approximately from tables of
a
statistics; and we will suppose that the chance - may be
A
O
ascertained in a similar manner. In that case 8-j-, the
dependence of 8 upon A, will be known and may be taken
as an approximate measure of the healthiness (when positive)
or unhealthiness (when negative) of the occupation A, A
o a a
statistical series S-r, S s , S ~ etc., might thus be convenientA xJ O
for affording comparisons of the healthiness or unhealthiness
of different occupations during that period of life.
As an illustration of the working of this notation, I give a
proof of the formula
A A 1
 SA
 at U
niversity of M
ichigan on A
pril 18, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
8 4 HUGH MACCOLL: SYMBOLIC REASONING.
in which a, a1, b, bl are the chances of A, A1, B, B1. The
proof by successive and self-evident equivalences is
A A A a B» A _ o /, _ B\
B ~ Bi = B " b1 ' A ° B b1 [ A)
A ' a (. b k\ b + V (A
Let p = probable; while, as in previous conventions, T =
true, e = certain, ei = uncertain, rj = impossible, TJI = possible.
Let <f> (T, p) denote the implication
(A-B')i>: (APB?^,
which may be read : " If it is probable that A and B are both
true, then it is true that A and B are both probable ". It is
clear that <f> (p, T) will then denote the converse (or inverse)
implication
(APBry : (A'B')P,
in which the words true and probable interchange places. The
symbol <£• (T, p) <f>" (p, r) will then assert (what is a fact) that
the former implication is necessarily true, but that the latter is
not necessarily true. A statement is probable when its chance
of being true is greater than one-half. Let yfr (r, p) denote the
implication
(A* + B')P : (AP + Bpy,
we get i/r« (T, p) yfr4 (p, T), which may be read : " It is not
certain that if it is probable that either A or B is irue, then it
is true that either A or B is probable ; but it is certain that if
it is true that either A or B is probable, then it is probable that
either A or B is true "
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